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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Essentially, the court has balanced the right of the individual
to know he is being confronted by a police officer, with the need
for disguised, under-cover officers in crime prevention. It held that
the officer has a duty to make reasonable efforts to inform the
citizen of his identity before the officer takes further action. A
reasonable attempt to inform does not amount to actual knowledge
on the part of the citizen, but does require a showing by the officer
that the citizen had reason to know or that a reasonable attempt
to so inform was made.
Later in the term Nelson v. Milwaukee' seemed to. indicate
that Celmer should be viewed as an unusual case and strictly lim-
ited to its facts. In Nelson an amended complaint in an action
against the City of Milwaukee alleged that the plaintiff was "negli-
gently" confined by city police. The trial court found the allegation
that the plaintiff was "arrested and imprisoned" demonstrated that
the cause of action was essentially one for the intentional tort of
false imprisonment. This finding was approved on appeal relying
on Strong v. Milwaukee' which held that section 895.43(3)1" pre-
cluded the bringing of a suit against a political corporation for the
intentional torts of its officers and employees, thus making a com-
plaint containing such allegations demurrable. It seems doubtful
that a different result would have been reached on the negligence
allegations if the suit had been brought against the police officers,
individually, rather than the city. The combination of Celmer and
Nelson in the same court term would seem to indicate that the
liability of police officers for negligent arrest has not been signifi-




In Zimmerman v. Brennan,' the court dealt with the growing
120. 57 Wis. 2d 166, 203 N.W.2d 684 (1973).
121. 38 Wis. 2d 564, 157 N.W.2d 619 (1968).
122. WIs. STAT. § 895.43(3) (1971):
No suit shall be brought against any political corporation, governmental subdivision
or any agency thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, officials, agents or
employees nor shall any suit be brought against such fire company, corporation,
subdivision or agency or against its officers, officials, agents or employees for acts
done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial func-
tions.
I. 56 Wis. 2d 623, 202 N.W.2d 923 (1973).
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practice of profit sharing trusts as a supplementary method of
employee compensation. The problem faced was whether or not
trustees of an employees' profit sharing plan can be removed be-
cause of conflict of interest based on their simultaneous position
as trustees and beneficiaries of the trust.
The case arose when an art studio had set up a profit sharing
plan for its employees. Two of the three trustees, however, were
not only owners of all the common stock but also officers of the
corporation and therefore entitled to share as beneficiaries of the
trust. The third trustee was the attorney for the other two trustees
and the company itself.
This particular plan gave wide discretion to the trustees as to
mode of payment and authorized them to cut off payments entirely
if an employee left the employ of the studio to work with a compet-
itor within a year after leaving the studio. Zimmerman, the em-
ployee in question, took a leave of absence apparently to return to
graduate school. There was then some dispute as to how he was to
be paid his share of the trust funds. When the trustees opted to pay
in annual installments instead of the lump sum payment requested,
Zimmerman sued for removal of the trustees on grounds of conflict
of interest. In the course of the litigation it was also learned that
Zimmerman had not in fact returned to school but joined a com-
peting firm; thus precipitating the forfeiture of all his rights under
the plan.
The trial court refused to remove the two beneficiary-trustees.
The petition for removal was refused even though there was a
conflict of interest and that by dismissing Zimmerman the trustees
stood to gain almost $1000.00 each. The trial court emphatically
pointed out that there was no finding of any mismanagement or
misconduct in 6ffice. The Supreme Court affirmed.
In arriving at this decision the court first examined section
231.26 of the Wisconsin Statutes2 which stated:
Upon the complaint of any person interested in the execution of
an express trust, and under such regulations as shall be estab-
2. Although this section was repealed by Ch.66 of the 1971 Session laws its pertinent
provisions were rewritten and renumbered. Wis. STATS. § 701.18(2) still reads substantially
the same:
A trustee may be removed in accordance with the terms of the creating instrument
or the court may, upon its own motion or upon a petition by a beneficiary or co-
trustee, and upon notice and hearing, remove a trustee who fails to comply with the
requirements of this chapter or a court order, or who is otherwise unsuitable to
continue in office. . ..
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lished by the court for that purpose, the circuit court may remove
any trustee who shall have violated or threatened to violate his
trust, or who shall be insolvent, or whose insolvency shall be
apprehended, or who for any other cause shall be deemed an
unsuitable person to execute the trust. (Emphasis added)
The question then presented was if a mere conflict of interest
in a profit sharing trust in itself justified removal of the trustees in
question. In formulating a negative answer, great reliance was
given to Estate of Gehl,3 where the court, in refusing to remove a
testamentary trustee, gave great weight to the fact that although
there was possible conflict, it was known to the testator, the father
of the trustees and of the beneficiaries of the trust, and therefore
was of only minor consequence.
The Zimmerman court then reasoned that, although it histori-
cally has demanded high standards of trustees which go even- be-
yond honesty and good faith, a profit-sharing trust presented a
different situation:
The unique character and purpose of a profit-sharing'trust must
be considered. Such a trust is for the benefit of both the employee
and the employer. The individual trustees often represent or are
identified with either the employer or the employees, so to speak,
and both these parties acknowledge that the trustees, who are
company employees or directors or stockholders, may have a
conflict of interest.'
Thus such a trustee of a profit-sharing plan who may have a con-
flict of interest was not an unsuitable person to execute the Trust.
Although the court later stated that the holding of this case is
confined to its facts, the impact of its logic may well have an effect
on nonprofit-sharing trusts as well. The main thrust of the court's
reasoning was that such a trust did not contemplate disinterested
trustees and that the intent of the parties would therefore be frus-
trated if a trustee with a conflict of interest was removed. But what
constitutes a contemplation of disinterested trustees? It would
seem now that trustees with conflicts of interest may not be re-
moved when the parties were aware of the conflict at the time of
the creation of the trus. Indeed Gehl seeins to be excellent author-
ity for such a proposition. An even further extention of this would
be that if the beneficiary discovered the conflict after the creation
3. 5 Wis. 2d 91, 92 N.W.2d 372 (1958).
4. 56 Wis. 2d at 628.
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of the trust, but acquiesced or made no objection, this may also
be a trust which does not contemplate disinterested trustees.
In Estate of Farber5 the court was faced with a situation where
the testatrix devised one half of her estate to her sister and the
other one half to her two nieces. There was no residuary clause.
She also stated explicitly that her half-brothers and sisters were not
to share in the testate property. 6 However, when she died she was
survived by a single niece; her sister and other niece predeceasing
her without issue. The trial court ruled that since the others had
predeceased the testatrix their shares in the estate lapsed and
should be paid over as intestate property to be shared by the heirs-
at-law according to the rules of intestate succession. The heirs-at-
law included, of course, the half-brothers and sisters which were
otherwise barred from taking under the will.
The court then considered the so-called rule of disinheritance.
That rule states that disinheritance by a will does not prevent the
person from sharing a lapsed legacy as an heir-at-law.7 The effect
of the rule is relatively simple. If the decreased dies partially intes-
tate, that property passes to the heirs under intestate succession
even if those heirs were explicitly excluded from taking under the
will. In other words, if property fails to pass under a valid will, an
instrument based on the desires and intent of the testator, it will
pass under the intestate succession laws which act irrespective of
the intent of the deceased.
The court in Farber, however, seemed to greatly modify this
rule in order to accommodate the apparent intention of the testa-
trix:
In those cases where the intent to completely disinherit a certain
heir or group of heirs is expressed beyond doubt, as evidenced
by positive language stating which heirs are to take, and if any
such heirs remain to take, the clearly expressed intention of the
testator shall be recognized. Any other rule would serve to defeat
the obvious intentions of the testator and thus violate the basic
constructional doctrine of wills that the intent of the testator is
paramount and must be given effect whenever possible.8
Certain questions immediately arise. The court used a rule of
5. 57 Wis. 2d 363, 204 N.W.2d 478 (1973).
6. ". . . it being my intention that all my estate shall be inherited by those above named,
kindred of the whole blood, and that none shall go to my brothers and sisters of the half
blood. .."
7. See, 4 BOWE-PARKER: PAGE ON WI.s, § 30.17 (1961).
8. 57 Wis. 2d at 368.
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construction of wills to arrive at their result. That is, when inter-
preting a will great weight should be given to the intent of the
testator. This, of course, is undisputed hornbook law. However, it
is questionable whether the court was using intent to help dispose
of property passing under a will or property passing under intestate
succession which ordinarily finds the intent of the deceased irrele-
vant. It would seem that the latter alternative is the correct one.
The court actually seemed to be using a doctrine of will construc-
tion to modify the law of succession which is involved only when a
valid will is not applicable.
Another way of interpreting the court's ruling is to view the
niece as taking the remainder of the estate, not by will or by
intestate succession but solely according to the "intent" of the
deceased. This too is unpalatable.
A better approach, perhaps, would be that of the court in Will
of Ziehlke,9 where the testator explicitly excluded his nieces and
nephews from taking under the will. 10 There the court applied the
law of descent without regard to the intention of the deceased:
Here, however, the nieces and nephews do not take under the will
but by law. The fourth paragraph being the residuary clause and
the gift failing, the residue goes by operation of the law of de-
scent. No doubt this is not what the testator intended, but the
only way in which he could vary the rules of descent would be
by making an effective gift at variance with these. This he did
not do."
In the case of Estate of Gotthart,'2 the court was asked to
interpret a devise to an heir of certain property that was occupied
as a homestead at the time of the execution of the will. The perti-
nent part of the will was quoted as follows: "I hereby give and
bequeath my homestead which I occupy at the time of my death
to my son, Gustave Gotthart."
Events subsequent to the execution of the will raised serious
questions about the homestead status of the certain property and
if the testator did, in fact, occupy the same at the time of his death.
The testator had lived in the house for over eight years, claiming
it as his homestead. There was no question that it was indeed a
9. 230 Wis. 574, 284 N.W.497 (1939).
10. "Fifth: For reasons known to all, it is my will and I hereby direct that no part of
my estate shall go to any of my nieces or nephews." Id. at 575.
II. Id. at 579.
12. 56 Wis. 2d 563, 202 N.W.2d 397 (1972).
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homestead at the time the will was drafted and signed. However,
the testator eventually suffered a stroke and was hospitalized for
three weeks. Because of his advanced years and weakened condi-
tion he was admitted to a nursing home upon discharge from the
hospital. He lived there for over a year when he was again hospital-
ized. Six days later he died. During the time of the testators resi-
dence in the convalescent home it apparently seemed obvious that
he would not be returning to his old residence for quite some time
if he returned at all. His son petitioned the county probate court
for the appointment of a guardian. Testator's personal effects were
all removed from the home and the premises were rented on a
monthly basis. The testator himself had consented to the removal
of his belongings and the subsequent rental. However, in order to
rebut the inference that this constituted an intention to abandon
the homestead, the court noted that on several occasions the testa-
tor told his children how much he wanted to come home.
The court decisively rejected the argument that the homestead
was abandoned and therefore that part of the will which devised a
homestead was nullified. It ruled that a homestead did, in fact,
exist at the time of the testator's death. The court relied on the case
of Herrick v. Graves 3 which held that
.a party would not forfeit the [homestead] exemption on
being absent from home a season, traveling with his family, even
though he should rent the premises to a tenant in the meantime,
or should be prevented, by some temporary necessity, from oc-
cupying his homestead for a time with his family.'" (Emphasis
that of Gotthart court)
The court noted that more than mere relinquishment of the
property was needed to extinguish homestead rights. There had to
be an accompanying or subsequent intention to discontinue the use
of the premises as a home. The court found no such intention here.
This interpretation, however, seems open to question. The real-
ities of life would seem to indicate to the testator that he would
probably never return to his former abode. He was an old man of
over 74 years. He had recently suffered a severe stroke that caused
him to be hospitalized for almost a month and leaving him in such
a weakened condition that he required the constant care and super-
vision of a nursing home for what turned out to be the rest of his
life. He realized that instant recovery was not forthcoming and
13. 16 Wis.163, (1862).
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consented to the rental of his home.
The court strongly implied that a permanent removal was not
enough to lose the homestaed status unless the testator voluntarily
removed himself or explicitly approved such action:
While such acts may themselves support a conclusion on the part
of the children that in all probability their father would never
return to his home, they fall short of evidencing an intent on the
part of the testator to abandon the homestead where he had lived
for the past eight years. 4
Thus, the court would seem to preclude the destruction of the
homestead status even where it is almost certain the property
owner will never return. The court stated that there must be an
"intention" to abandon, but it can be argued that a narrow defini-
tion of "intention", which fails to include the situation where it is
physically necessary to abandon despite the desires of the homes-
teader, may work injustice to the original objectives of the home-
stead statutes.
The better justification for allowing the devise to the testators
son was given by the court when interpreting the word "occupy".
The court stated that if the property owner did not, in fact, occupy
the premises at the time of his death and that if the words of the
will were read literally the devise would fail, this is not an absolute
bar. Rather, the language of the will should be looked at with
consideration to the surrounding circumstances at the time of its
execution and a determination made in accord with the intent of
the testator. Perhaps this would have been a less tortuous way of
allowing a grant of a "homestead" where that homestead status
had expired after execution of the will.
In Richards v. Richards, 5 the court clarified the status of the
constructive trust, pointing out that fraud was no longer a neces-
sary element of that equitable remedy and in fact held that no
evidence of wrongdoing of any kind was needed to invoke a con-
structive trust. In that case the father of the plaintiff had secured
a divorce settlement from his first wife. Part of the settlement was
a stipulation that the children of that marriage, the plaintiffs, were
to be named beneficiaries of certain insuii'ance policies maintained
by their father. Subsequent to the divorce, the father remarried and
named his new wife, the defendant, as the sole beneficiary of that
14. 56 Wis. 2d at 567.
15. 58 Wis. 2d 290, 206 N.W.2d 134 (1973).
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policy. The defendant was guilty of no fraud or wrongdoing in
securing her status as beneficiary. In fact, she did not even know
about the existence of the policy until after the death of her hus-
band and a letter from the insurance company informing her of its
existance.
In denying plaintiff's petition for a constructive trust on the
insurance proceeds, the trial court noted their was no wrongdoing
involved and therefore the doctrine of constructive trust could not
be applied. In so holding the trial court relied on Will of Jaeger,'"
which held that a constructive trust would arise only if there is
evidence of fraud.
The supreme court, in rejecting this view, noted that the Jaeger
requirements for constructive trust had been abandoned in an ear-
lier case. The court in Estate of Massouras,'7 said the fraud re-
quirement was too restrictive and inconsistant with the basic pur-
pose of the equitable device of a constructive trust. The alternative
test offered in that case, however, seemed to be only a watered
down version of the fraud test. The court in Massouras stated:
[A constructive trust] is implied by operation of law as a reme-
dial device for the protection of a beneficial interest against one
who either by actual or constructive fraud, duress, abuse of con-
fidence, mistake, commission of a wrong, or by any form of
unconscionable conduct, has either obtained or holds the legal
title to property which he ought not in equity and in good consci-
ence beneficially enjoy. (Emphasis added).
The holding in Richards can be seen as a clear expansion of the
Massouras test since the defendant was guilty of none of the above
quoted modes of conduct. Here she merely accepted the proceeds
of an insurance policy, the existance of which she had only recently
learned.
In support of this interpretation the court also relied on two
other cases, Lee v. Preiss,'9 and Estate of Boyd.21 In Lee the hus-
band orally promised to maintain an insurance policy with his
divorced wife as beneficiary to compensate for his lack of support
payments during the pendency of the divorce. He also made re-
peated representations to his children to that effect. Nevertheless
16. 218 Wis. 1, 259 N.W.842 (1935).
17. 16 Wis. 2d 304, 114 N.W.2d 449 (1962).
18. Id. at 312.
19. 18 Wis. 2d 109, 118 N.W.2d 104 (1962).
20. 18 Wis. 2d 379, 118 N.W.2d 705 (1963).
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after the divorce decree he changed the beneficiary provision on the
policy excluding his former wife. Although the court did not rely
on the doctrine of constructive trust they did hold that the equita-
ble rights to the proceeds were superior to the rights of a named
beneficiary.
In Boyd the court was faced with a divorce stipulation for
insurance benefits similar to that in Richards. However, like in Lee
the court did not impress a constructive trust on the proceeds
received by the beneficiary but instead allowed a claim against the
estate of the deceased identical to the amount of the proceeds. The
claim was allowed, the court reasoned, because a stipulation in a
divorce action was in the nature of a contract which should be
given a construction that would best reflect the intention of the
parties."'
It should be emphasized that in neither of the two above men-
tioned cases was the rule of constructive trust relied on. The hold-
ing in Richards then opens up the constructive trust remedy in such
divorce stipulation situations and may well effect the expansion of
the remedy in other cases.
The case of Kinzer v. Bidwell2 dealt with the problem of avoid-
ing passive trusts. In this case Kinzer, the appellant, purchased a
lakefront lot from the respondants. He also brought an undivided
one-sixth interest from them in certain property just off the lake.
Before the sale of the interest the respondants had owned that
property subject to an agreement that no party would sell his inter-
est without first offering it to the others at cost and that no im-
provements be made on the property without the unanimous con-
sent of the owners. In order to better effectuate the agreement the
respondents put the property in trust. Kinzer bought his interest
subject to this trust.
He later tried to sell his interest in this property and brought
suit for a partition. The trial court held that the land agreement
was void because it was a passive trust and therefore the parties
held the land in common and could partition. The trial court did,
however, reform the agreement because of mutual mistake, to pro-
hibit any development of the land for several years.
The supreme court in reviewing this case noted that the refor-
mation depended on the validity of the trust agreement. If the trust
21. See also Miner v. Miner, 10 Wis. 2d 438, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960), for another example
of this kind of reasoning.
22. 55 Wis. 2d 749, 201 N.W.2d 9 (1972).
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was indeed active, and therefore valid, there would be no need for
the reformation. An examination was then made into the validity
of the land trust. It was noted that in any major action the trustee
could not act unless directed to do so by four-sixths of the benefici-
aries. On this basis the trial court held the trust was passive.
Black's Dictionary, (4th ed.) defines a passive trust as: "A trust
as to which the trustee has no active duty to perform." Such trusts
which provide no real function for the trustee are generally held
to be void. Several theories have been used to support this rule.
One is the common law Statute of Uses which dictated such a rule
in real property trusts, another is a rule in equity that courts will
not require or permit the doing of a useless thing. 23
Whatever the rationale for this view, Wisconsin explicitly for-
bids this kind of trust. The legislature has stated:
Every trust, to the extent it is private and passive, vests no title
or power in the trustee, but the beneficiary takes a title corre-
sponding in extent to the beneficial interest given him. A trust is
passive if the title or power given the trustee is merely nominal
and the creating instrument neither expressly nor by implication
from its terms imposes active management duties on the trus-
tee.24
In holding that the trust in question was an active and valid
trust the court first examined the purpose of the trust. It noted that
the trust was created to maintain the property in its natural and
undeveloped state and prohibit sale or lease of the interest of indi-
vidual shareholders unless four-sixths of them decided otherwise.
Possession and control was therefore placed in the trustee to main-
tain the land in this state by stopping less than four-sixths of the
beneficiaries from selling their interests or building improvements
upon the land.
The court held that this duty, in itself, was sufficient to consti-
tute an active duty even though the trustee was helpless to act on
any major matter without approval of four-sixths of the
beneficiaries.
In addition to this there was evidence that the trustee main-
tained liability insurance, ascertained and paid taxes, handled in-
quiries from parties desiring to buy or list the property for sale and
collected money from beneficiaries for payment of taxes, insurance
23. See generally, BOGERT on TRUSTS (4th ed., Hornbook series) 119-122.
24. WIs. STATS. § 701.03 (1971).
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and the like. The court found that this additional evidence was
more than enough, coupled with the duty to maintain the status
quo, to create an active trust.
The case is a clear indication that the Wisconsin court may well
follow the trend of finding that any duty, however conditional or
slight, will be sufficient to create an active trust, and the court will
be more than generous in finding the duty to be more than just
nominal so as not to violate the statutory requirement.
RICHARD CONGDON
